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 1 
Safeguarding British identity or betraying it?  
The role of British ‘tradition’ in the Parliamentary  
Great Debate on EC membership, October 1971 
 
 
This article will re-visit the crucial parliamentary decision in October 1971 that 
Britain should join the EEC. It will explore the context of the vote and explain why so 
much of the debate focused on the terms of membership rather than the principle of 
membership itself. But it will also show that both those in favour of EEC membership 
and those against viewed the vote as a great matter of principle and invoked a 
number of key British traditions in their efforts to justify their stance. Opponents of 
entry thus sought to portray EEC membership as endangering three great traditions: 
Cobdenite liberalism, British internationalism, and the UK’s ability to govern itself.  
Those on the other side of the argument rejected all three of these claims, viewed the 
choice for Europe as opting for an exciting future rather than clinging unrealistically 
to former glories, and claimed that they were acting in line with a central British 
tradition – i.e. that of being a country that mattered and had a say when crucial 
decisions, economic and political, were being made. 
 
 
 
Against a backdrop of controversy about Britain’s place within today’s European 
Union (EU), and in particular the question of whether such involvement is a threat to 
the national character and traditions of the United Kingdom, it is important to look 
back at the debate that surrounded Britain’s initial decision to join the then European 
Economic Community (EEC).  This matters in part because of the frequent assertion 
that the true nature of the European Community was never properly discussed at the 
time of this original decision.  Britain, it is claimed, was pushed ‘into Europe’ by 
misguided leaders while the country slept, to paraphrase the title of one of the more 
extreme iterations of this case (Evans 1975).  But it is of value also because a return to 
the original debate can highlight the extent to which the decision ‘to join Europe’ was 
viewed by those responsible as being compatible with, or threatening to, Britain’s 
fundamental traditions. 
 For the purposes of this article the original moment of decision will be 
considered to be the Parliamentary vote of October 28, 1971.  This is not the only 
possible choice.  Cases could be made for April 1961 when the government of Harold 
Macmillan decided to launch the first abortive bid to enter the EEC; for April-May 
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1967 when the Labour government of Harold Wilson decided to submit a second 
membership application; for June 1970 when the newly elected Conservative 
government led by Edward Heath revived the second British application which had 
remained on the table despite General de Gaulle’s November 1967 veto; or for June 
1975 when Britain’s European membership was confirmed in the referendum that 
Wilson had promised voters when he was returned to power.  But the October 28, 
1971 vote, as the climax of over ten years of governmental and parliamentary debate, 
had a cathartic value that not even the 1975 referendum could match.  The six days 
debates, involving 180 speakers, and amounting to over 422,000 words are also the 
most accessible instant at which to measure the aspirations and fears, hopes and 
misgivings, with which the British opted to become members of the European 
Community. 
 This article will begin by briefly recalling the circumstances of the 1971 
debate.  It will then go onto explore a number of factors that complicated the so-called 
‘Great Debate’ and made it more than a straight clash between two rival visions of 
Britain and its place in the world.  The awkward position of the Labour Party 
leadership, most of which found itself opposing the outcome of a membership 
negotiation that it had launched, helps explain why so much attention was placed by 
Wilson and his allies on ‘the terms of entry’ rather than the principle of EEC 
membership.  This in turn contributed to that substantial portion of the debate which 
revolved around seemingly secondary matters such as the exact arrangements secured 
for Caribbean sugar producers, the quantities of New Zealand butter that the UK 
could import, or the precise extent of British waters from which continental fishermen 
would remain excluded.   Yet despite the time devoted to such nitty-gritty affairs it is 
still possible to identify attempts by both sides to portray the vote as a great matter of 
principle and to invoke a number of key British traditions in their efforts to justify 
their stance. Opponents of entry thus sought to portray EEC membership as 
endangering three great traditions: Cobdenite liberalism, British internationalism, and 
the UK’s ability to govern itself.  Those on the other side of the argument rejected all 
three of these claims, viewed the choice for Europe as opting for an exciting future 
rather than clinging unrealistically to former glories, and claimed that they were 
acting in line with a central British tradition – i.e. that of being a country that mattered 
and had a say when crucial decisions, economic and political, were being made. 
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The context 
In formal terms, the October 28 vote was on the motion, moved on October 21 by the 
Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas Home, ‘That this House approves Her Majesty's 
Government's decision of principle to join the European Communities on the basis of 
the arrangements which have been negotiated’ (Hansard, 21.10.1971, column 912). A 
positive vote constituted an essential precondition for the subsequent parliamentary 
approval of the European Communities Bill, the legislation which would sanction 
Britain’s entry into the European Communities and would acknowledge the effect in 
the United Kingdom of pre-existing European Law.  The actual passage of that bill 
would be a separate affair, with its clauses scrutinised between January and July 1972, 
a parliamentary marathon involving no fewer than 104 divisions (Kitzinger 1973, 
pp.386–396).  None of the subsequent votes however were as dramatic or as closely 
followed as the initial vote of principle.  A focus on the October decision thus seems 
justifiable. 
 At the heart of the debate lay the terms of accession negotiated since June 
1970 between the British and the six founding members of the European Community 
(O’Neill 2000; Furby 2009).  Heath’s government did not have to re-apply to the 
EEC; Wilson’s 1967 application had never been withdrawn, despite the French veto.  
With French opposition now lifted and the Six having established their approach to 
the enlargement negotiations in internal discussions spanning the first half of 1970, 
whichever British government emerged from the general election of June 18 was 
expected to open membership negotiations.  It had thus been under Heath’s leadership 
that the negotiations had begun, albeit using negotiating briefs drawn up under Labour 
(Kitzinger 1973, p.83). 
  By the late summer of 1971 the negotiations were all but complete.  Talks 
were continuing, it was true, over the rules of the highly controversial Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP).  But the vast majority of the issues had been settled and 
Heath’s government was anxious to begin the process of parliamentary approval so as 
to remain on course for Britain to enter the Community on January 1, 1973.  
Westminster thus became the stage for the third act in the membership negotiations 
drama, the first two having been played out in Brussels and in Paris where Heath and 
Georges Pompidou, the French President, had held a highly publicised summit in May 
1971.  The outcome of the play was still open.  Both the main political parties were 
deeply split on the issue and a government victory in the vote could not be taken for 
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granted.  The October debates were not just for show; on the contrary there was a very 
real sense amongst those taking part that they were engaged in a parliamentary 
confrontation of historic significance.  As Heath put it, ‘I do not think that any Prime 
Minister has stood at this Box in time of peace and asked the House to take a positive 
decision of such importance as I am asking it to take tonight. I am well aware of the 
responsibility which rests on my shoulders for so doing. After 10 years of negotiation, 
after many years of discussion in this House and after 10 years of debate, the moment 
of decision for Parliament has come’(Hansard, 28.10.1971, column 2202). 
 The party political backdrop to this moment of Westminster history was 
highly complex.  Heath had been elected in 1970 with a small, but normally adequate 
majority of 31.  On Europe, however, this was unlikely to suffice, given the presence 
of a vociferous group of Eurosceptics within his party.  In order to win the vote of 
principle, the government would have to rely on support from within the opposition.  
A year earlier this would have been straightforward.  The Labour government had 
applied to join the EEC in 1967, a step approved by an overwhelming bipartisan 
majority within the House of Commons of 488 votes to 62 (Parr 2006; Wall 2012, 
pp.80–360).  Wilson as Prime Minister had famously refused to take de Gaulle’s ‘no’ 
for an answer, ensuring that Britain’s second application remained a topic of 
Community debate despite French opposition (Pine 2007).  And had Labour 
triumphed as expected in the 1970 general election, a new Wilson government would 
have opened negotiations with the Six, most probably with Roy Jenkins, the most 
prominent Labour pro-European, serving as Foreign Secretary and George Thomson, 
another pro-European, in charge of the negotiating team (Wall 2012, pp.350–360).   
Heath’s electoral victory, however, shook Labour’s pro-European sentiments.  
Once in opposition, many of those who had acquiesced in the 1967 application 
reverted to their original misgivings, while others, notably the former Chancellor 
James Callaghan took advantage of the shifting mood in the party and public hostility 
towards EEC membership, to seize the European issue as a major stick with which to 
beat the government (Kitzinger 1973, pp.300–302).  Somewhat more reluctantly 
Wilson, as party leader, followed suit (Jenkins 1991, p.320).  A sizeable group of 
Labour pro-Europeans including Jenkins, the deputy leader, were meanwhile left 
marooned within a party that seemed headed for an ever more sceptical position. 
Officially the party’s commitment to enter the Community still stood.  But a specially 
convened Labour Party conference in July 1971 committed the party to a rejection of 
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the ‘Tory terms’ and instructed MPs to vote against the government’s European plans 
(Kitzinger 1973, pp.305–309).  Heath’s ability to secure the outcome he sought would 
thus depend on how many of the pro-European opposition MPs were prepared to defy 
their party.  So as to encourage Labour defections, the Conservatives decided to make 
their vote a free one; Labour by contrast maintained a three-line whip, a decision 
which also had the effect of silencing those pro-European members of the opposition 
frontbench who could not support their party’s position.  Jenkins, Thomson, Shirley 
Williams and Harold Lever were all prevented from speaking as a result (Jenkins 
1991, pp.329–330). 
 
 
 
The debate 
Fortunately the quality of speeches remained high despite the sidelining of such 
eloquent potential contributors. Indeed many of those pro-European Labour speakers 
who took their place, whether rising stars like Roy Hattersley and David Owen, or 
former ministers, like Michael Stewart, spoke with an effectiveness and commitment 
that made them stand out even amid a generally high standard of debate.  But the 
Labour rebels had no monopoly on good speech making.  There were some 
impressive contributions from all quarters, whether Tory Eurosceptics – Derek 
Walker-Smith and Edward du Cann were the most striking -, Labour opponents like 
Peter Shore or Joan Lester, pro-government Tory backbenchers like Selwyn Gummer 
or Christopher Tugendhat, or Liberals like David Steel and Jo Grimond. 
 The political background does however help explain certain characteristics of 
the debate that would otherwise appear bizarre.  The first of these was the 
determination of Conservative speakers in particular to exploit Labour’s recent volte-
face on the issue and ridicule Wilson’s lack of consistency.  This trend produced a 
good range of verbal jibes, including Robert Carr’s comment about the Labour Party 
taking a package tour to Damascus (Hansard, 25.10.1971, column 1362). It was 
deployed perhaps most effectively by one of the Labour rebels, Maurice Edelman, 
who quoted significant portions of the highly pro-European speech that Wilson had 
delivered in Strasbourg in the context of the 1967 application (Hansard, 27.10.1971, 
column 1828). And it added a moment of levity to the final day’s exchanges when 
Wilson unwisely sought to use the same tactic at the expense of Reginald Maudling, 
 6 
the Home Secretary, who had indeed been uncertain about Britain’s first turn to 
Europe in the Macmillan era, only to be swatted down with the instant response: ‘As I 
recall that quotation, it referred to 1958. I have certainly changed my mind on this, but 
I would say that it is rather more understandable to change one's mind in 13 years 
than in 13 months’ (Hansard, 28.10.1971, column 2119). 
 The recent nature of Labour’s reversal also explains why so many of the 
Labour rebels were able to speak, with great sincerity, about how unaccustomed they 
were to finding themselves out of step with their party leaders.  This was not a revolt 
manned by the professional malcontents.  Instead, it was largely made up of those 
who had been within the mainstream of their party only months before, but had found 
themselves unable to jettison their European beliefs with the rapidity shown by others.  
That the most strident calls for the Labour pro-Europeans to change their mind came 
from left-wingers much more accustomed to defying the Labour whips only made the 
position of the pro-Europeans that much more striking, as Ivor Richard pointed out.  
Since being a Member of Parliament I have not voted against my party on a 
three-line Whip. I hope that some of my honourable Friends will forgive me if 
I observe that a large section of those now advocating that I should stand on 
my head and vote against my principles and, instead, vote with my party, have 
far greater experience of the way in which one votes against a three-line Whip 
than I have. So if I need lectures on party loyalty I do not think, with respect, 
that I would first turn to them (Hansard, 28.10.1971, column 2148). 
 
A third characteristic of the debate linked to Labour’s changed position, but 
also a product of Heath’s rhetoric and the consistent lack of popular support for EEC 
entry was the huge amount of time spent discussing whether or not the Conservatives 
had a ‘mandate’ to carry out so significant change in Britain’s international, economic 
and constitutional position.  Predictably this was a line of argument passionately 
advanced by those opposed to EEC membership, sometimes accompanied by the 
statistic that over 60% of Conservative candidates had failed to mention Europe in 
their electoral addresses in 1970 (e.g. Hansard, 25.10.1971, column 1428).  This last 
point though was unsurprising, given that the election had been fought at a time when 
all three major English parties were committed to EEC membership and so the 
European choice had not been an issue of contention in the campaign.  The stubbornly 
hostile state of public opinion towards EEC entry, as revealed by multiple opinion 
polls, was a more serious issue, however, especially given Heath’s public pledge to 
take Britain into the EEC with ‘the full-hearted consent’ of the British people.  The 
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government had sought to redress the unpopularity of membership by running an  
‘information’ campaign about the EEC that had at times transgressed the line between 
neutral information and propaganda – a charge that was repeatedly levelled at Heath 
during the debate (e.g. Hansard, 21.10.1971, column 937).  But despite such efforts 
polls continued to suggest much public anxiety about EEC membership and little of 
the enthusiasm for the political unity of Europe that had characterised opinion 
amongst the Community’s founder members (Jowell & Hoinville 1976).  
Much time in Parliament was thus spent agonising about whether MPs were 
entitled to adopt a position on an issue of such importance that ran contrary to the 
views of their constituents.  Responses amongst those in favour of EEC membership 
varied widely.  Some contested the validity of opinion polls in general or sought to 
suggest that their own attempts to consult their constituency had not revealed the 
same degree of disquiet (Hansard, 21.10.1971, column 983).  Others acknowledged 
the concern felt by much of the public but argued that this was inevitable before a 
change of such magnitude and would vanish once the benefits of membership began 
to be felt – a line sometimes backed up by allusions to public misgivings amongst the 
founder member states when the Treaty of Rome had been signed (Hansard, 
22.10.1971, column 1166).  And multiple others delved into Parliamentary tradition, 
using Edmund Burke to argue that MPs should be free to take crucial decisions 
without necessarily following the views of their electors. An alternative approach was 
to attack the courses of action being suggested by those who insisted upon a mandate.  
Edelman for instance dismissed the idea of a referendum – a minority choice even 
amongst those who felt that the public ought to be given their say – as ‘the instrument 
of the demagogue’ (Hansard, 27.10.1971, column 1827).  Nor would a general 
election be much more helpful, given that both main parties were split on Europe and 
there would be many constituencies in which one or more of the candidates would 
have positions on the issue at odds with their party’s official line (Hansard, 
28.10.1971, column 2125).  
The most conspicuous consequence of Labour’s last minute change of heart, 
though, was the salience within the debate of the terms of membership, as opposed to 
the principle of membership itself.  This was not, admittedly, an entirely new 
phenomenon. Ever since Macmillan had made the 1961 application conditional on 
Britain being able to negotiate adequate safeguards for the Commonwealth, British 
farmers, and the UK’s partners in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the 
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terms of membership had played a central part in the British debate about entering the 
EEC (Milward 2002, p.310 ff.).  Nor was it strange that individual MPs should want 
to discuss the precise repercussions of ‘joining Europe’ on particular interest groups 
of concern to them.  But the fact that the Labour leadership had submitted the 
membership application under discussion, and remained wedded, officially at least, to 
the idea of joining the EEC were the right terms to be negotiated, meant that much of 
the opposition could only disown the government motion on the grounds that the 
‘Tory terms’ fell short of what a Labour government would have required. 
The upshot was a debate in which the fundamental rights and wrongs of EEC 
membership were often semi-hidden behind an argument about the precise safeguards 
agreed with the Six for a number of interest groups liable to be hurt by Community 
policies.  Perhaps the most predictable sectors to be examined were farming and 
fisheries (e.g. Hansard, 22.10.1971, columns 1096-1113).  Each represented a 
significant economic activity in a large number of constituencies.  And each was 
liable to be affected by the Community’s two most interventionist policies – the CAP 
and the CFP.  That trawler men and apple growers, horticulturalists and hill farmers 
were all periodically invoked is unsurprising and very much in line with what 
occurred in the comparable debates amongst other member states seeking to join the 
Community.  But where the British debate diverged from the norm was the amount of 
attention paid to interest groups far beyond the United Kingdom itself.  New Zealand 
butter and cheese producers, sugar cane growers in Australia, and above all the sugar 
producers of the West Indies were all discussed at length, exposing sharp divisions of 
opinion about whether their interests had been adequately addressed (Hansard, 
27.10.1971, columns, 1822, 1928, 1941, 1957 & 1969).  The Commonwealth had 
become less of a problem for the exponents of British EEC membership than it had 
been in the early 1960s, largely because Commonwealth countries had been able to 
sense the way in which the wind was blowing ever since 1961 and had sought to 
diversify their export patterns as a result, but it still constituted an emotive issue for 
many parliamentarians (May 2001). 
 
A clash of traditions 
The prominence of the Commonwealth in the debate about membership terms also  
signals the importance within the Great Debate of a number of broader appeals to 
British history and tradition.  At one level indeed it is possible to view the 
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parliamentary clash of October 1971 as one that pitted those in favour of preserving 
what they regarded as vital characteristics of the British world role and manner of 
governing itself, against others who were willing to jettison such traditions and boldly 
leap into a shared European future.  Looked at in these terms, the three big issues at 
stake in the 1971 European choice, were first the Cobdenite liberal tradition of ‘cheap 
food’, second the related internationalist tradition, and third Britain’s tradition of 
parliamentary democracy.  Each of these deserves to be examined in turn. 
The first highly populist appeal to tradition made by those opposed to 
Community membership was the need to protect a Cobdenite liberal tradition of 
buying food cheaply on the world market, with resultant low food prices in the shops, 
against the shift to a system where European farmers were supported by means of 
artificially high food prices.  It had long been recognised that a move from the 
traditional UK system of agricultural support to the CAP was likely to entail a 
substantial increase in food prices (Ludlow 1997, pp.93–94).  Exactly how big this 
rise would be was hard to calculate, given the shifting nature of both world 
commodity prices and the artificial European prices that lay at the heart of the CAP.  
Estimates hence varied wildly.  Amongst those opposed to British membership 
however there was agreement that joining the EEC would break with Britain’s 
longstanding tradition of buying food cheaply on the world market – a tradition that 
had prevailed ever since the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846.  The Labour MP David 
Stoddard was one of many to bring this up during the Great Debate complaining  
It seems absolutely crazy to substitute for a cheap food policy a dear food 
policy merely to subsidise the development of a foreign agricultural industry 
which will then compete on perhaps not equal terms with our own…. Having 
built a strong industry, we now find that the British housewife, not the British 
taxpayer, is expected… to subsidise the development of continental agriculture 
(Hansard, 21.10.1971, column 962). 
 
Michael Foot, meanwhile, made a more explicit link to the Cobdenite tradition.  On 
October 25 he thus declared ‘The end of the era of cheap food is no small incident in 
British history, even if the Leader of the Liberal Party is not prepared to shed a single 
tear at the abandoned tomb of Richard Cobden’ (Hansard, 25.10.1971, column 1263).   
The perceived incompatibility between Britain’s traditional pattern of food 
purchases and the CAP also underpinned the fierce exchanges around the question of 
how much Britain would contribute to the Community budget. Under the European 
agricultural system, shaped as it had been by the very different needs of continental 
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food producers such as the Netherlands and France, Britain was liable to pay heavily 
for the tradition, which it hoped in part to retain, of importing much of the food it 
needed from extra-European producers, since the levies imposed upon imported 
foodstuffs would go directly into the Community budget.  UK receipts from that same 
budget would be lower than those of its partners, meanwhile, because partly as a 
result of its longstanding cheap food policy it had proportionally fewer farmers than 
most other member states and would therefore receive less by way of CAP support, 
still at this stage the biggest item in the Community’s overall budget.  The outcome 
would be a situation in which the UK paid more into the Community budget than 
would be expected given its size and wealth, while receiving significantly less money 
back from the EEC than other countries of a similar stature.  It was hence certain to be 
one of the major net contributors to Community coffers, perhaps the single biggest 
contributor.  As with food prices, however, exactly how much the UK would end up 
paying was impossible to calculate with any precision, since much would depend on 
the evolution of UK trade patterns, on the gap between world and Community food 
prices, and on the broader development of the EEC budget.  Again therefore wildly 
varying figures were bandied about in the course of the debate, with opponents of 
entry predictably selecting the most alarmist ‘guestimates’.   
 Such economic arguments about the costs – to the food buyer and to the tax 
payer – of joining the EEC, shaded into the second major tradition to be invoked by 
those hostile to British membership, namely that of internationalism.  Thus for many 
Eurosceptics, especially but not solely those on the left of the Labour Party, a decision 
to enter the Community would imply not a broadening of the UK’s international 
horizons but their contraction.  In certain cases, this view sprang from the belief that 
the EEC was a narrow rich-man’s club, bound to favour its own interests over those of 
others, to behave in a protectionist fashion inimical to the interests of the developing 
world, and still shaped by the reactionary views of some of its members, notably 
France.  A clear example of this vein of thought was the speech by Joan Lestor on the 
opening day of the debate: 
The main objective of the E.E.C., as I see it…is to protect and defend the rich 
European nations against the rest of the world. That is clear for everybody to 
see. It is concerned with improving itself. I accept that one of its by-products 
is that we can give more to the developing world. But if Europe is to be seen 
in this context—and this is how I see it as an internationalist—the major 
competitive interests centred in Europe ultimately will seek to strengthen their 
own power. This is the history of any organisations which band together for 
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the purpose of improving their lot, and this will be in the nature of the E.E.C. 
But this power which will be used to strengthen the E.E.C. will not include the 
developing world (Hansard, 21.10.1971, column 956). 
 
Britain should thus cultivate its own independent ties with the developing world, 
rather than restricting its ability to do so by joining the EEC. Other opponents still 
seemed to place their faith in the type of North Atlantic Free Trade Area arrangements 
with which the Wilson government had briefly flirted.  Jeffrey Thomas, a Welsh 
Labour MP, argued for instance that rather than turning to the EEC, Britain should 
launch ‘[a]n initiative which included North America, E.F.T.A.—which the pro-
Marketeers seem to forget altogether—and the rest of non-E.E.C. Europe and Japan 
alone would account for over three-quarters of the industrialised non-Communist 
world. That is enough for a start. That is a big enough market for this country’ 
(Hansard, 27.10.1971, column 1971).  And a third group, more often Conservative 
Eurosceptics (or anti-Marketeers as they tended then to be called) continued to believe 
that Britain should either rely primarily on the Commonwealth, sometimes the white 
Commonwealth – i.e. the old Dominions like Australia and New Zealand – or put its 
faith in a long term trend towards world wide free trade (e.g. Hansard, 27.10.1971, 
columns 1819-1822).  Such claims had a degree of populist appeal given the still 
strong sentimental ties between Britain and Australia, New Zealand and Canada, even 
though their economic credibility had declined significantly in the light of the 
dwindling relative importance of trade between Britain and its former colonies.  
Uniting all these disparate notions however was the sense that Britain should be 
international, should be open to world trade, and should be involved in global affairs, 
but would best be able to fulfil this internationalist and global vocation outside of the 
EEC.   Community membership would threaten rather than bolster Britain’s 
traditional global commitment, eroding its existing commercial ties, and limiting its 
ability to build new relationships. 
 The third key tradition perceived as being at risk was the United Kingdom’s 
ability to govern itself.  For some, both of the left and of the right, this danger centred 
on the incompatibility between European supranationalism and British notions of 
Parliamentary sovereignty – in other words the type of sovereignty argument that has 
remained at the heart of Eurosceptic critiques of the EC/EU right up to the present 
day.  But before looking more closely at some early manifestations of this enduring 
line of thought, it is worth briefly mentioning a more ephemeral anxiety which while 
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also involving fears about lost independence centred not on the somewhat abstract 
notion of parliamentary sovereignty but instead on a specific technocratic policy 
domain, namely regional policy – i.e. the ability of central government to channel 
money towards less prosperous areas of the country.  This was a theme that loomed 
surprisingly large in the October 1971 debates, perhaps reflecting the sizeable number 
of Eurosceptic Labour MPs from peripheral parts of the British Isles.  Of concern to 
many of those who spoke on this theme were two inescapable realities of EEC 
membership. The first was that areas such as Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, or 
the north of England that were already peripheral within a UK economy, would 
become even more so were Britain to become part of a larger entity, the economic 
centre of which would lie in what was termed the ‘golden triangle’ of Germany, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Eastern France.  Second, by entering the EEC Britain 
would cede its ability independently to determine its regional policies, thereby 
endangering its existing tax relief and subsidy schemes.  So not only would the 
disadvantaged areas grow still more disadvantaged because of EEC membership, but 
the existing mechanisms for alleviating the problem would be called into question by 
European competition rules and by the Community’s own incipient regional policy.  
Particular alarm surrounded the idea that European Commission approval would have 
to be obtained for new forms of regional assistance.  As William Ross, the MP for 
Kilmarnock put it, ‘There is no doubt in my mind that our regional policies, which 
were successful to a certain extent under successive Governments, will not, and 
cannot, be successful under what is proposed. The regions will be further away from 
the centre, and, therefore, it will be more and more difficult to get industries to go to 
them’ (Hansard, 26.10.1971, column 1501).  Others adopted more sensationalist 
language, one speaker challenging the government to say how they would prevent 
‘large parts of Britain from becoming Northern Europe's Calabria’ (Hansard, 
26.10.1971, column 1619). 
 The sovereignty case elevated these fears of Britain losing the power to govern 
its own affairs from the specific instance of regional policy to the more general level 
of principle. In the process it also sought to shift the underpinning of scepticism from 
a technocratic fear about Britain losing control of a particular aspect of governmental 
action to a more populist refrain about fundamental British liberties being at stake. 
Some such warnings flirted were over-dramatic.  Elystan Morgan opened his speech 
by stating: 
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I… welcome this opportunity of taking part in this historic debate. There has 
been nothing like it before in the history of Britain. It must by almost any 
consideration be regarded as the last of its kind. Parliament is about to decide 
on its own a matter affecting the lives and the future of the British people. 
A time will come soon when, whatever decision is made by Parliament in a 
number of spheres, it will be necessary for that decision to be ratified by a 
Council of Ministers or by a European Commission or by the European 
Parliament. At this moment this debate has a real meaning for those of us who 
have the privilege of being Members of the House. We are able to decide this 
issue knowing that our own decision is unaffected by the will or the decision 
of any body outside (Hansard, 25.10.1971, columns 1422-3). 
 
But others revealed a rather greater degree of familiarity with the way in which the 
Community operated – and the manner in which it might evolve.  Sir Derek Walker-
Smith for instance, while unable to resist a certain amount of oratorical hyperbole -  
‘In time, the edifice of our Parliamentary system, built by the resolution of our 
forefathers and sustained by the sacrifice of successive generations, would crumble at 
last in the dust’ – did at least acknowledge that the scope of the Treaty of Rome was 
initially limited to a number of economic domains and would hence leave large 
portions of British sovereignty unaffected.  Even these, however, might be threatened 
in due course, given the openly declared desire of many pro-Europeans to see the 
Community’s sphere of operation expand.  He too therefore concluded that EEC 
membership would pose a fundamental danger to a notion of Parliamentary 
sovereignty, thereby eroding a central feature of the way in which Britain had long 
been governed (Hansard, 28.10.1971, columns 2129-2136).  Tony Benn, Michael 
Foot, Peter Shore, Enoch Powell, Edward du Cann, and Robert Taylor all presented 
variations on the same theme, albeit variations coloured by their highly divergent 
positions on the political spectrum.   The populist ‘no taxation without representation’ 
slogan was invoked on several occasions, normally in reference to the introduction of 
Value Added Tax (VAT) that would accompany EEC membership but also 
sometimes more widely in the expectation that other forms of taxation would 
ultimately be affected by EEC entry (Hansard, 27.10.1971, column 1935).  And 
multiple speakers attacked the Community for its bureaucratic nature and lack of 
democracy.  A strong component of the anti-Marketeer case thus centred on the threat 
to Britain’s traditional habits of governance posed by the alien methods and goals of 
the Treaty of Rome. 
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 In response those in favour of EEC membership tended to adopt two main 
approaches.  The first was to seek to rebut each of these alleged threats to British 
traditions, suggesting either that they were based on a misunderstanding of the nature 
of the Community as it was or as it might become, or that they were grounded in an 
illusory view of Britain’s existing power and influence.  The second, by contrast, was 
to reject the notion of clinging onto tradition, and instead present EEC membership as 
an exciting step into a bright new future.  As such this second strand of pro-Marketeer 
rhetoric echoed Rab Butler’s famous rejoinder to Hugh Gaitskell, the Labour Party 
leader’s 1962 suggestion that EEC membership would constitute the ‘end of a 
thousand years of history’: ‘For them [the Labour Party] a thousand years of history 
books – for us [the Conservatives], the future’ (The Guardian, 12.10.1962). 
 Alarmist claims about either rising food prices or the crippling nature of 
Britain’s budgetary contribution were thus countered by disputing the projected 
figures, highlighting Britain’s ability once inside the EEC to begin to address those 
features of the CAP that it most objected to, and the prediction that the rising 
prosperity which it was hoped EEC membership would bring would both soften the 
impact of increased food prices and outweigh the potential threat to the UK’s ever-
fragile balance of payment position posed by high contributions to the EEC budget. 
More fundamental still was the suggestion that food prices should probably not be the 
main criterion on which so politically vital a decision should rest.  As one 
Conservative MP put it en route to portraying the EEC as a vital mechanism for 
preserving peace in Europe: ‘I remind the House that nearly 200 years ago the 
Americas were lost to Britain over the price of a packet of tea, and I would earnestly 
hope that on this occasion Europe and Britain will not be lost to posterity over the 
price of a pound of butter’ (Hansard, 27.10.1971, column 1978). 
 In rejecting the idea that Community membership would mark the end of 
British internationalism, advocates of EEC entry made a number of interlinked points.  
The first, highlighted in the government White Paper advocating entry, was that 
greater prosperity would allow Britain to spend more on aid (The United Kingdom 
and the European Communities, 1971).  Second, the inward-looking nature of the 
Community was disputed, both by highlighting the sums spent by the EEC and its 
member states on aid, and by noting the large number of developing countries that 
had already become, or would become after enlargement, associate members enjoying 
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preferential access to European markets.  Michael Stewart, for instance, who as 
Labour Foreign Secretary had been deeply involved in the 1967 application, noted: 
It has been argued that the E.E.C. is an inward-looking body and a white man's 
club. In the course of the argument, fewer things have been more clearly 
demonstrated than that the Community, both as a body and its individual 
members, has been able to be more generous in ways that we should like than 
British Governments have been able to, even with the best will in the world. 
So far from being inward-looking, the extent of the world over which it makes 
arrangements and agreements and the area of the world which turns towards it 
are increasing steadily. Therefore, we are more likely to find ourselves getting 
more remote from parts of the Commonwealth if we stay out than if we go in 
(Hansard, 26.10.1971, column 1516). 
 
Third several of the Labour rebels queried how true internationalism could be 
furthered by rejecting the opportunity closely to cooperate with the rest of Europe, 
especially given the increasing role within the governments of the Six played by 
socialist parties.  As A.E.P. Duffy put it at the end of speech that had made much of 
ties between the Labour party and like-minded Europeans,  
it is distressing for me to see Socialist colleagues turn away from Europe and a 
practical opportunity to further the international brotherhood of man. But 
when they invite me to join them in the Lobby against entry they distress me 
even more. For they are not only asking me to vote in defiance of my basic 
convictions and sense of duty to my constituents, they are also asking me…. to 
join them in a Lobby that, however fortuitously, is confidently expected to 
attract representatives of the forces of all that is most narrow, parochial and 
puritanical in our society (Hansard, 27.10.1971, columns 1985-6). 
 
 The counterblast to the sovereignty case was also made up of several different 
components.  One argument was that the United Kingdom would enjoy the right to 
veto any Community developments of which it disapproved.  The Luxembourg 
Compromise of 1966 was thus presented as a major step in making the EEC more 
congenial for Britain.  The Foreign Secretary asserted at the very start of the debate:  
Political change, it is agreed, has to be unanimous. On all important matters 
they [the Six] have found that they must proceed by consensus. That is the 
experience after ten years of practice in the Community. 
The reason is clear. Great countries with the history of the European nations 
cannot be dragooned or coerced into a pattern of political association which 
one or the other of them does not like. The attempt would be folly. It would 
break up the Community. Even to try to do such a thing is totally against the 
spirit of the association (Hansard, 21.10.1971, columns 920-921). 
 
Second large areas of domestic policy remained untouched by the EEC and were 
likely to remain so.  The attempt by some opponents of entry to question what might 
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happen to the social security system within the Community was rejected on these 
grounds, for instance.  Third, the idea that Britain would retain pure and undiluted 
sovereignty by remaining outside of the EEC was strongly disputed.  The country had 
already signed up to multiple international commitments that limited its freedom of 
action, from NATO through to the United Nations.  Furthermore, within an 
interdependent world it was questionable how much sovereignty any state retained.  
Several of the Labour rebels who had recently witnessed the decimation of their 
party’s plans to reform Britain at the hands of the international money markets were 
especially forceful on this point.  David Marquand for instance asked rhetorically why 
the Labour government had been blown off course, before providing his own brutally 
honest answer: 
They were blown off course because economic power was not under their 
control. They were blown off course because no nation of 50 million people in 
the modern world can be wholly the master of its own economic destiny, 
wholly master in its own economic house. That is a fact of life whether we like 
it or not. I believe that if we try to create a Socialist society in isolation from 
the rest of Western Europe and the rest of the Western world, we shall go 
through the same miserable experience as we did from 1964 to 1970. I do not 
believe that alternative is valid. I regret it—emotionally, I regret it. 
Emotionally I can see the attractions of creating a Socialist society in Britain 
alone, a sort of beacon to lighten the rest of the world. It is an attractive vision, 
but it is not real; and I do not see it as a practical alternative. 
 
It therefore followed that the aims of the political left could best be realised in 
cooperation with their European partners rather than in isolation (Hansard, 
27.10.1971, columns 1914-1917). Hattersley, Stewart, Robert Maclennan, and 
Edmund Dell all made very similar points. 
 Even more pervasive amongst the pro-Marketeers was the refrain that a choice 
for Europe was a forward-looking move whereas a vote against would be a backwards 
step.  To some extent this involved dismissing the arguments of opponents as being 
shaped ‘by myopic nostalgia, by Mittylike dreams’ to use Gilbert Longden’s phrase 
(Hansard, 25.10.1971, column 1383).  But it was also furthered by repeated 
declarations that Europe represented a way of breaking out of the frustrations of the 
recent past and embracing an exciting future.  Thus for Gummer, ‘The real choice is 
the opportunity which the Common Market gives, on the one hand, and the certainty 
of decline which removal from the Market would give if we make the wrong choice’ 
(Hansard, 27.10.1971, column 2026). Dick Leonard, one of the Labour rebels, 
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announced: ‘I shall not be voting with the majority of my fellow Party members 
tonight. I shall be casting a vote for Europe. This will be a vote for wider 
opportunities and a higher standard of living for the people of Britain. It will be a vote 
in favour of closer international co-operation and a vote for peace. It will be a vote for 
the future’ (Hansard, 28.10.1971, column 2172).  And Jeremy Thorpe, the leader of 
the Liberal Party, predicted ‘I believe that a large majority will cast their votes to 
unite and expand an outward-looking, free democratic Europe, because by doing so 
they will cast their votes for a better world’ (Hansard, 28.10.1971, column 2129).  A 
strong streak of idealistic optimism suffused much of the pro-European case. 
 Simply to conclude here, however, and to present the 1971 choice as a vote for 
tradition or advance, stasis or progress, would be misleading.  For a start it would be 
to do a disservice to the opponents of entry, most of whom eschewed the sort of 
xenophobic or parochial Little England rhetoric that might perhaps have been 
expected, and instead sought to raise a number of sincere, thoughtful and often well-
argued concerns about what British involvement in the integration process might 
entail.  Quite a number of their warnings, furthermore, whether about the costs of the 
CAP, the budgetary burden likely to be faced by Britain, the rather depressing short 
term prospects for European economic growth during the 1970s, or the creeping 
expansion of European powers and areas of activity with all that that might mean for 
national sovereignty, now look rather more prescient than some of the rose-tinted 
assumptions of those advocating EEC entry.  But to caricature the choice in such a 
fashion would also be to overlook the extent to which a central plank of the ‘yes’ case 
– especially when voiced by Conservatives – also appealed to a longstanding British 
tradition, namely that of Britain’s role as a global power deeply involved and 
influential in the key debates of the day.  It is therefore this final invocation of British 
tradition that the last part of this article must address. 
 An excellent example was provided by the speech of Ivor Stanbrook, a 
Conservative MP.  He began by recalling the merits of the British empire.  The world 
had changed, however, and the empire was no more.  The country thus needed a new 
outlet for its energies and talents – an outlet that Europe could provide.  
I do not advocate joining Europe out of lack of an alternative policy. I 
advocate it because I believe that the British race…has made a unique 
contribution to the progress of mankind in the past and is now far from having 
exhausted its vitality, whatever the geo-political context in which it may 
operate; and I advocate it because I believe that the wider the arena in which 
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Britain's power and influence is exercised, the better for mankind (Hansard, 
27.10.1971, columns, 1941-1946). 
 
Frontbench speakers tended to be more careful about sweeping generalisations  
on the virtues of the British people.  But running through the speeches of both Home, 
opening the debate, and Heath closing it, not to mention multiple other Tory MPs in 
between, was a persistent argument that Britain had been influential and had grown 
accustomed to such influence, but that in order to retain influence it had to be able to 
contribute to the vital decisions being taken amongst the member states of the 
European Community.  To quote Home,  
when Germany, France, Italy and the rest sit down to talk about their problems 
of security, and their attitude to world problems, I use the word in the most 
accurate sense when I say that it is vital that we should be in their councils. 
During the last year I have twice been in the councils of the Ten, because they 
have anticipated the larger Community. Matters are talked about there which 
concern the defence of Europe and the defence of Britain. Matters are talked 
about—for example, the Middle East—which have the greatest implications 
for our country. It is essential that we should be in the councils when these 
questions are discussed, and that a decision should not be taken without us 
(Hansard, 21.10.1971, column 922). 
 
And Heath, to whom it is apt that the last quotation should be given, advanced a 
strikingly similar line of argument, noting the European Summit meeting planned for 
1972 in which key discussions would be held about monetary issues, trade, and 
Europe’s political future, and emphasising how essential it was that Britain was 
represented at such a gathering. 
If by any chance the House rejected this Motion tonight, that meeting would 
still go on and it would still take its decisions which will affect the greater part 
of Western Europe and affect us in our daily lives. But we would not be there 
to take a share in those decisions. That really would not be a sensible way to 
go about protecting our interests or our influence in Europe and the world. But 
to be there as a member of the Community, in my view, would be an effective 
use of our contribution of sovereignty. 
 
Surely we must consider the consequences of staying out. We cannot delude 
ourselves that an early chance would be given us to take the decision again. 
We should be denying ourselves and succeeding generations the opportunities 
which are available to us in so many spheres; opportunities which we 
ourselves in this country have to seize. We should be leaving so many aspects 
of matters affecting our daily lives to be settled outside our own influence. 
That surely cannot be acceptable to us. We should be denying to Europe, 
also—let us look outside these shores for a moment—its full potential, its 
opportunities of developing economically and politically, maintaining its 
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security, and securing for all its people a higher standard of prosperity 
(Hansard, 28.10.1971, columns 2211-2212). 
  
  
Conclusions 
Immediately after Heath had finished speaking the historic vote on the principle of 
joining the European Community was held.  The outcome was a decisive vote in 
favour of the motion by 356 to 244.  Crucial to the size of this victory – and indeed 
without which the vote would instead have been lost – was the decision of 69 Labour 
MPs to defy their party and vote in favour.  Twenty others abstained.  This more than 
compensated for the 39 Conservatives who voted ‘no’.  The stage was thus set first for 
the lengthy pitched battle to get the detailed European Communities Bill through 
Parliament, and then for Britain to take its place within the newly expanded 
Community of Nine on January 1, 1973.  After more than ten years of debate about 
whether Britain should join the EEC, a decisive answer appeared to have been given. 
 In making this choice, parliament seemed to have been swayed more by the 
desire to see Britain continue to matter on the European and world stage, and by the 
hazy but oft-invoked appeal of greater prosperity and an exciting new future within an 
integrating Europe, than by the threat that EEC membership had been said to pose to 
several core British traditions.  None of the passionate pro-European arguments had 
wholly demolished the concerns being raised about how Community membership 
might affect Britain’s long-standing tradition of feeding itself cheaply on liberally 
traded commodities, the UK’s multiple and deep-rooted links with many regions of 
the world beyond the European continent, or the country’s ability to govern itself 
wholly with laws made in Westminster.  Nor, as events would prove, were the 
sceptics being purely alarmist in their dire predictions about the budgetary costs of 
EEC membership or the less than rosy short term future of Western Europe’s 
economy.  But such considerations had ultimately been of less importance for those 
who voted on October 28, 1971 than a strong sense that to reject EEC membership 
would be to spurn a chance to reverse two or more decades of economic and political 
decline, and to invite a degree of marginalization in European and global affairs that 
was all but impossible to swallow for a political generation brought up to believe that 
Britain was and ought to remain a great power. 
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 Looking back at the Parliamentary Great Debate – at the exchange of 
economic and political, populist and technocratic arguments reviewed by this article, 
and at the appeals to both tradition and a bold new future- does not just explain why 
this step was taken, however.  It also helps explain why this seemingly fairly clear-cut 
decision has turned out to be one that has repeatedly been called into question.  This is 
not, it should be stressed, to accept the claim, made both in the immediate aftermath 
of UK’s entry and again much more recently, that the British were misled and 
persuaded to accept membership in a narrow commercial entity without being aware 
that the EEC was a political project liable to develop in the future.  The Great Debate 
provides no evidence for this at all, since both those in favour and those against, 
alluded repeatedly to the political nature of the Community and to the multiple 
political implications of either going in and staying out.  Yes, there was a lot of 
discussion about the economic consequences of the choice, in part because of the 
emphasis on the terms of membership, and in part because the economic arguments 
for and against seem to have had the greatest resonance amongst the wider public.  
But the political dimension was of immense concern to the political elite and was 
discussed passionately by both those in favour and those against.  Their views 
moreover were widely covered in the press.  Nobody who read any of the reams of 
newsprint on the Great Debate could have harboured any delusions on this score. 
 More significant in terms of explaining why the Great Debate failed to end 
controversy over Britain’s European choice, is the way in which a close reading of the 
parliamentary exchanges underlines quite how passionately against the EEC many of 
the opponents of membership were.  A substantial core of the anti-Marketeers were 
hostile to the very notion of Britain in Europe in a manner that was unlikely quickly to 
fade once the 1971 vote had been lost.  Instead there was every likelihood that the 
debate would need, in effect, to be restaged albeit in a different form, once Heath had 
been replaced by a Labour government.  Furthermore, it is also the case that through a 
mixture of ill fortune and poor tactics many of the benefits of EEC membership most 
eagerly anticipated by those who had cast their votes in favour were either slow to 
appear or did not materialise at all.  The fact that Britain’s entry coincided with the 
start of a major global economic downturn meant that the hoped-for surge in 
prosperity did not happen.  The UK’s halting economic performance in the 1970s 
probably had little to do with the decision taken in 1971 and might even have been 
worse had the country remained outside of the EEC, but the recession certainly meant 
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that there was no lengthy economic honeymoon of the sort that the six founder 
members of the EEC had enjoyed.  Economically the bold new future outlined by so 
many of the pro-Marketeers did not live up to expectations. 
 Even more importantly the anticipated political pay off was much less tangible 
than hoped.  From 1973 onwards (and indeed even from 1972) the British were 
included in the councils of the Community and able to play their part as crucial 
decisions were taken.  But here too reality diverged sharply from what had been 
foreseen.  For a start the collective gatherings of the expanded Community were hard 
hit by the economic downturn with the result that reaching consensus proved more 
painful than had often been the case in the less turbulent times before Britain had 
joined (Möckli 2008).  Britain, moreover, in part because of its ongoing misgivings 
about Community membership, failed to assert itself in that leadership capacity 
towards which Heath – and Macmillan and Wilson before him – had unquestionably 
looked.  Instead, when bold new steps were taken, as with the establishment of the 
European Monetary System in 1978-79, France and Germany retained their firm grip 
on the steering wheel, with Britain confined to the much less exhilarating role of 
manning the brakes (Dell 1994).  And even more insidiously public attitudes failed to 
take that crucial step of which Heath had confidently spoken in his winding up 
speech, and went on regarding the Community as ‘they’ not ‘we’ (Hansard, 
28.10.1971, column 2209).  Thus even when advance did resume, this was more of a 
threat than a triumph, a menace to Britain’s traditions and interests, rather than a 
source of pride about the new traditions and patterns of behaviour collectively being 
forged with European partners.  
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